NEW
YORK - MIAMI - LA - HONG KONG - DUBAI - SINGAPORE - BEIJING
Syllabus
for ANTI
AVOIDANCE REGIMES
I.
COURSE DESCRIPTION
Non-resident
professors Kithsiri De Silva
Traditionally Taught
by Kithsri (“Lucky”) DeSilva of the New Zealand
Revenue with assistance by other countries Revenue officials.
This course examines the general legal principles,
tax regulations, case law, and audit procedures concerning
anti tax-avoidance many OECD countries. Issues concern economic substance; business purpose; economic
benefit; abuse of law; assignment of income; thin capitalization;
anti-deferral regimes like control foreign company legislation,
taxation of passive investment income held in foreign entities,
and foreign trust regimes; anti-tax haven regimes; and other
anti-avoidance legislation.
Kithsiri
Lakshman De Silva
I
have been in the field of taxation since 1963 when I joined
the Department of Inland Revenue of Sri Lanka. Since then
I have worked as a tax expert in Kenya and Botswana and
am presently working in the Inland Revenue Department of
New Zealand as a corporate investigator. I have worked both
for Revenue and the private sector which has given me a
better understanding of the view points of both. I have
gained practical and theoretical experience in almost all
aspects of taxation. My special fields of work have been
in Investigation, intelligence and multi national taxation.
I have lectured on taxation at the national and international
level.
oy
Saunders is the founder and chairman of the International
Fiscal Services Group of companies which has offices in
London, Amsterdam, Madrid, New York, Cyprus, Jersey and
Curacao. The Principals of these offices are specialists
in international fiscal law who provide Clients and their
professional consultants with technical advice on the organisation
of their international business arrangements. The IFS Group
was formed to offer international tax planning advice coupled
with corporate and personal asset management in the major
jurisdictions commonly used as business centers.
Roy
Saunders qualified as a Chartered Accountant in 1967 and
has specialized in international fiscal law since the early
seventies. As a Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in England and Wales, he is an acknowledged authority in
the field of international taxation, and has lectured extensively
worldwide for various professional bodies including his
own Institute, the International Tax Planning Association
(ITPA), ESC International Ltd, Economist Conferences and
many others. He is on the executive committee of the ITPA
and the editorial boards of Tax Planning International,
CITE and FDTA.
Roy
is known throughout the world for his many books and publications,
the foremost being an 800 page loose leaf work entitled
‘International Tax Systems & Planning Techniques’
(Financial Times Law & Tax) which is now into its 34th
Release and which analyses the tax systems of more than
twenty five countries from the viewpoint of transactions
involving residents of other countries. Other publications
have included Structuring International Real Estate Transactions
(Sweet & Maxwell), Principles of Tax Planning (Tax Management
International), Tax Planning for Businesses in Europe (Butterworth)
and Intelligence Report: Cyprus International Tax Planning
(Financial Times Law & Tax). He is a regular contributor
to Tax Planning International, a monthly tax publication
of the Bureau of National Affairs in Washington, Practical
Tax Planning and Precedents (Financial Times Law & Tax),
International Tax Planning (Tolleys) and the articles published
in the IFS Tax Digest, IFS News and the IFS Tax Guides all
of which can be found on the IFS Website at
http://www.interfis.com.
1.
MODULE 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.
Objectives and the plan of this Course
Tax
avoidance is a very nebulous concept. In FCT
v Newton (HC), Taylor J expressed the view that:
"it
is a condition precedent to the liability of a taxpayer
that he shall derive income and it is difficult to understand
how, except in a loose sense, a person can be said to avoid
liability to tax by putting himself in a position where
he will, neither in fact nor in law, derive future income”.
This
is the paradox that engages the attention of those that
practice tax avoidance and those who try to combat it. Can
you actually avoid something that that has already occurred?
The answer to it is both yes and no. Yes because if you
are quite certain that a liability is inevitably due to
arise you can take steps to move out of its path. That would
be like getting out of the way of a train bearing down on
you. Isn’t that the sensible thing to do? This is
called the preventative method. If it has already arisen
then it becomes a little more difficult. However the ingenious
tax planner has found a way to do that also. And this is
called the curative method. You will learn more about all
these methods later.
Even
as Tax avoidance is difficult to define, the problem of
understanding it is compounded by the fact that its interpretation
from one tax jurisdiction to another also varies. An example
is the way in which that the concept of substance
and form is applied in different tax jurisdictions by
Courts of Law. There is another dimension that complicates
our studies. That is the changes that occur in legislation
from time to time reflecting changes in public and judicial
tolerance of the many complex tax schemes created by tax
practitioners. Tax practitioners need to be aware of the
current state of the law not only in the country of residence
of the taxpayer, but also of the countries that they may
be using to implement their tax plans.
It
would be futile to attempt to cover in depth all the anti
avoidance provisions enacted by legislatures of all countries
in the brief period of 14 weeks. What this course does provide
is a broad overview of the provisions found in many OECD
countries and a few other selected countries.
The
objective of this course is to give the students an understanding
of the fundamental principles that underlie anti avoidance
provisions and to acquaint you with the current of state
of the law in selected countries.
The
course will cover the following areas of study:
Week
|
Beginning
|
Module
|
|
|
|
1
|
12-Jan-01
|
INTRODUCTION
|
2
|
19-Jan-01
|
DEFINITIONS
OF TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION |
3
|
26-Jan-01
|
TAX
PLANNING |
4
|
02-Feb-01
|
SHAMS
|
5
|
09-Feb-01
|
CONCEPTS
OF RESIDENCE AND SOURCE |
6
|
16-Feb-01
|
RESPONSE
OF LEGISLATURE TO AVOIDANCE |
|
|
GENERAL
ANTI AVOIDANCE REGIME |
7
|
23-Feb-01
|
CONCEPTS
OF SUBSTANCE AND FORM AND ABUSE OF LAW
|
8
|
01-Mar-01
|
SPECIFIC
ANTI AVOIDANCE RULES |
|
|
CONTROLLED
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS |
9
|
08-Mar-01
|
SPECIFIC
ANTI AVOIDANCE RULES |
|
|
CONTROLLED
FOREIGN COMPANIES REGIME |
10
|
15-Mar-01
|
SPECIFIC
ANTI AVOIDANCE RULES |
|
|
TRANSFER
PRICING |
11
|
22-Mar-01
|
SPECIFIC
ANTI AVOIDANCE RULES |
|
|
THIN
CAPITALISATION |
12
|
29-Mar-01
|
SPECIFIC
ANTI AVOIDANCE RULES |
|
|
ADVANCE
PRICING AGREEMENTS |
13
|
05-Apr-01
|
THE
USE OF DOUBLE TAX AGREEMENTS FOR AVOIDANCE
|
14
|
12-Apr-01
|
REVIEW
OF IMPORTANT TAX CASES |
|
|
|
|
There
will be 10 assignments to be completed during the semester
and these will
contribute to your final grades.
Recognizing
the fact that most of you are not full time students and
are constrained by the time you could devote per week to
your studies the weekly study guides will be limited to
approximately 25 to 35 pages. However you are expected to
read the selected tax cases each week.
The
final grades will be assigned as follows:
|
Criteria
|
Marks
|
1 |
Participation
( 10 assignments) |
20 |
2 |
Multiple
choice paper |
20 |
3 |
Practical
exercises-problem solving |
20 |
4 |
Case
law paper |
20 |
5 |
Dissertation
(10 paged) |
20 |
|
Total |
100 |
Collection
assistance
Globalization
of the economy not only makes it harder for tax authorities
to determine the correct tax liabilities of their taxpayers,
it also makes the collection of tax more difficult. Taxpayers
may have assets throughout the world but tax authorities
generally cannot go beyond their domestic borders to take
action to collect taxes. For this reason, the Working Party
is developing an article on collection assistance for inclusion
in the OECD Model Tax Convention.
Combating
corruption: The tax dimension
The
first milestone in the OECD effort against international
bribery was the 1994 Recommendation for countries to take
effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery
of foreign public officials in connection with international
business transactions. In 1996, at the suggestion of the
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, the Council recommended that
Member countries that allow the tax deductibility of bribes
to foreign public officials re-examine this treatment with
a view to denying the tax deductibility of such bribes.
The Working Party on tax evasion is monitoring the implementation
of the 1996 Recommendation.
In
May 1997, Ministers endorsed the Revised Recommendation
on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions.
In particular, they reaffirmed their commitment to criminalize
bribery of foreign public officials in an effective and
coordinated manner. They noted that an international Convention
in conformity with the common elements agreed to by Member
countries is an appropriate instrument to attain such criminalisation
rapidly. They recommended that Member countries should submit
criminalisation proposals to their legislative bodies by
1 April 1998 and seek their enactment by the end of 1998.
Ministers promptly commenced the negotiation of a convention
with a view to its entry into force in 1998 and urged the
prompt implementation of the 1996 Recommendation on the
tax deductibility of bribes. The Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions entered into force on 15 February 1999 after
having been signed by 34 countries and ratified by 11.
As
a result of these developments, all OECD Member countries
concerned have now taken action to prohibit the deductibility
of bribes to foreign public officials (the update on country
practices may be found on http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/index.htm).
The
Working Party on tax evasion is now working on a manual
to implement legislation denying the deductibility of bribes.
It is also providing input from a tax perspective, to the
Working Group on Bribery which is discussing ways to respond
to the decision of the OECD Council to examine, on a priority
basis, the issues of bribery acts in relation to foreign
political parties, advantages promised or given to any person
becoming a foreign public official, as well as the role
of foreign subsidiaries and offshore centers
in bribery transactions.”
During
the week beginning 9th February you will be informed
of the topic(s) that you would have to write your dissertation
on and the format in which it should be presented. It is
important that you agree your topic with the professors
as early as possible to allow you enough time to conduct
your research. You will be able to seek the assistance of
the professors to identify reading material for your dissertation.
1.2.
This module consists of the following topics:
·
What is tax avoidance?
·
Public and judicial opinion that affects its
definition
·
What makes tax avoidance possible
·
Main concepts
·
Definitions of tax avoidance
·
The main areas of tax avoidance
·
Descriptions of tax avoidance by the Courts
·
OECD summary of tax avoidance and its effects
·
Appendix 1
Glossary of commonly used words and phrases
·
Assignment 1
2.
What is tax avoidance?
2.1. Finance
literature may offer some guidance to what is meant by tax
avoidance in its definition of arbitrage’. Arbitrage
is a means of profiting from a mismatch in prices. An example
is finding and exploiting price differences between
countries in shares in the same listed company. Tax
arbitrage is a form of tax planning. It is an activity directed
towards the reduction of tax by exploiting such differences
between the incidence of tax on the same transaction within
the country or between two or more countries.
2.2. It
is this concept of tax arbitrage that may constitute a generally
accepted notion of what is tax avoidance. Activities such
as giving money to charity or investing in tax-preferred
sectors, could fall into this definition of tax arbitrage,
and thus would be acceptable tax avoidance in a wider sense
even if the action were motivated by tax considerations.
2.3. Tax
arbitrage can have a useful economic function. If differences
in taxation are deliberate government policy furthering
economic efficiency, it is possible that tax arbitrage directs
resources into activities with low tax rates, as intended
by government policy. It is also likely to ensure
that investors in tax-preferred areas are those who can
benefit most from the tax concessions, namely, those facing
the highest marginal tax rates. If government policy objectives
are better achieved, tax arbitrage is in accordance with
the government’s policy intent. Unacceptable tax avoidance,
then, can be viewed as a form of tax arbitrage that is contrary
to legislative or policy intent.
2.
Public and judicial opinion
Tax
being as old as civilization and human nature being what
it is, we could safely assume that the practice of tax avoidance
is not a modern phenomenon. It is human nature that tax
avoidance stems from and an early example in recorded history
is that of Mesopotamians who 6000 years ago attempted to
swim across the rivers in order to avoid paying a toll levied
by the King for the use of his ferry. The unfortunates who
were caught were fined. This obviously indicates that the
imposition of penalties was also an ancient art.
Another
example is that of the 17th Century city dwellers
in England who boarded up their windows to avoid paying
a tax on windows.
The
attitude to tax avoidance and evasion has depended to a
large extent on the prevalent political ideology and the
socio-economic environment of each country. The role of
the Government as perceived by the people and their attitude
towards their obligations to the State influences the way
that they look at persons who attempt to avoid tax.
The attitude to tax avoidance in the UK, for example,
has changed dramatically over the last century, to the point
where the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown in his
first Budget speech in 1997 announced that the Government
is
“committed
to the proper funding of public services” and “will
not tolerate the avoidance of taxation and will be relentless
in its war against tax avoidance.
I have...instructed the Revenue to carry out a wide-ranging
review of areas of tax avoidance, with a view to further
legislation in future Finance Bills. I have specifically
asked them to consider a general anti-avoidance rule.”
Indeed,
this stance against tax avoidance schemes in general can
be seen in numerous countries around the world and is not
unique to the UK.
Public
opinion ultimately influences judicial opinion. If the majority
of persons in a country are engaged in a form of tax avoidance,
such practice may soon be considered the norm and be treated
as acceptable. Looking across the spectrum of judicial opinion
expressed over time, it can be noted that opinion has varied
from those judges who thought that the practice of tax avoidance
was “not a
virtue” (Lord Denning) to those that thought that
it disclosed “an
ingenious use” of the legislation (Barwick
CJ in FCT v Westraders
Pty Ltd).
Lord Templeman in IRC
v. ex parte Matrix Systems Limited
[1994] STI 249 went as far as saying:
“every
tax avoidance scheme involves a trick and a pretence. It
is the task of the Revenue to unravel the trick and the
duty of the court to ignore the pretence.”
Both
the Legislature and the judiciary have shown concern over
the effect of Tax avoidance on society. Woodhouse J in Elmiger
v CIR (1966) NZLR expressed the following view:
“There
has been a growing awareness by the legislative and the
courts alike that ingenious legal devices contrived to enable
individual taxpayers to minimize or avoid their tax liabilities
are often not merely sterile or unproductive in themselves…but
that they have social consequences which are contrary to
the general public interest”.
On
31 March 1998 the Chartered Institute of Taxation in the
UK issued a Press Release on the “Tax Avoidance Debate”.
Of particular interest is the following extract:
“If
a GAAR is to be introduced to give the tax authorities powers
to ensure the law is interpreted as intended, its operation
must extend to giving taxpayers the ability to claim reliefs
or exemptions which were intended but which seem to be denied
by the words of statute.
In
any debate on this area, people need to be reminded that
tax avoidance is legal; also that none of us condones tax
evasion. Tax avoidance is probably impossible to define.
Avoidance is something that changes with years and trends.
It is also the case that one man's tax planning is another
man's tax avoidance. After all, is investing in a PEP or
participating in a PRP scheme tax avoidance?
It
has to be said that the term "tax avoidance" is
becoming an emotive one. Because of the emotion that is
aroused, balanced debate may be lost. It is perhaps arguable
that the debate should focus on "tax planning"
- or that, as we propose below, that any GAAR must be balanced
by a statement that tax planning is acceptable.”
The
question of GAARs (General
anti avoidance rules) will be covered later.
From
the all the above extracts it is clear that tax avoidance
is not universally defined or accepted. For the advisor
this is problematic since the advisor will be at pains to
ensure his client receives the best possible advice without
contradicting any domestic or international law.
If his profession is therefore stigmatised is this
fair? Is public
perception of tax avoidance the correct one and what influences
this perception?
3.
What makes tax avoidance possible?
Three
conditions need to be present for tax avoidance to take
place.
3.1. A
difference in the effective marginal tax rates on economic
income is required. For arbitrage to exist, there
must be a price differential and, in tax arbitrage, this
is a tax differential. Such tax differences can arise because
of a variable rate structure, such as a progressive rate
scale, or rate differences applying to different taxpayers,
such as tax-exempt bodies or tax loss companies. Alternatively
it can arise because the tax base is less than comprehensive,
for example, because not all economic income is subject
to income tax.
3.2. An
ability to exploit the difference in tax by converting high-tax
activity into low-tax activity is required. If there
are differences in tax rates, but no ability to move from
high to low-tax, no arbitrage is possible.
3.3.
Even if these two conditions are met, this does not
make tax arbitrage and avoidance possible. The tax system
may mix high and low-rate taxpayers. The high-rate taxpayer
may be able to divert income to a low-rate taxpayer or convert
highly-taxed income into a lowly-taxed form. But
this is pointless unless the high-rate taxpayer can be recompensed
in a lowly-taxed form for diverting or converting his or
her income into a low-tax category. The income must come
back in a low-tax form. The benefit must also exceed the
transaction costs. This is the third necessary condition
for tax arbitrage.
Since
all tax systems have bases that are less than comprehensive
because of the impossibility of defining and measuring all
economic income, tax arbitrage and avoidance is inherent
in tax systems.
4.
Main concepts
4.1.
Definitions of Tax Avoidance
When
dealing with tax avoidance on an international scale it
is difficult to define it in one simple statement. Each
country’s definition would depend on the rationale
on which its legislation has been enacted. There
is another difficulty. Two words that are commonly found
in tax avoidance legislation and thus in tax literature
are “avoid” and “evade”. In common
usage they are often interchangeable. But, in the tax context
they have very different meanings. This has made some writers
to comment that the legal definition of tax avoidance has
become a term of art.
The
IBFD International Tax Glossary defines avoidance as being:
“the
reduction of tax liability by legal means.
It often has pejorative overtones, where for example
it is used to describe avoidance achieved by artificial
arrangements of personal or business affairs to take advantage
of loopholes, anomalies or other deficiencies of tax law.
Rules introduced into the law to prevent or circumvent
certain types of avoidance which are disapproved of by the
legislature may be described as “anti-avoidance provisions”
or “provisions against legal avoidance”.
In contrast with avoidance, tax evasion is the reduction
of tax by illegal means”
4.2.
The Main Areas of tax Avoidance
In
this Study Guide tax avoidance as a concept will be taken
to encompasses all activities by which persons attempt to
reduce the amount of tax that would otherwise be payable.
Another way would be to say that it incorporates all behavior
that is tax induced. Because conceptions of tax avoidance
vary significantly, the wide view of the concept can be
considered to encompass all forms of conduct or activity
that either attempt and/or result in the reduction or elimination
of tax otherwise payable. This view focuses upon the activity
and/or result rather than the acceptability or otherwise
of such activity or result. In this respect tax avoidance
is treated as a generic term and tax evasion and other forms
of tax induced behavior treated as species of it. Having
said this we will soon find that this definition may be
too simplistic and too general. But for the moment it will
suffice.
To
understand the international dimensions of tax avoidance
it is important to start at the general meaning of it as
it applies to domestic tax legislation. The popularity of
international tax avoidance schemes may be of recent origin
but they are based on the same principles that have driven
domestic tax avoidance for years. The range of activities
covered by the term spreads from the perfectly legal and
acceptable forms to the highly suspect and dangerous forms
of criminal behavior. The main broad areas of tax avoidance
can be classified as follows:
·
Tax planning
·
Tax mitigation
·
Acceptable tax avoidance
·
Unacceptable tax avoidance
·
Tax avoision
·
Tax evasion
These
areas are not distinct and separate from each other. In
fact they are sometimes synonymous and often overlap.
It is impossible to express a precise test as to
whether taxpayers have avoided, evaded or merely mitigated
their tax obligations.
As we go along we will study specific examples that
will illustrate this point.
4.3.
Descriptions
of Tax Avoidance By the Courts
The
description is ultimately a matter of judgment for the courts.
As Baragwanath J said in Miller
v CIR; McDougall v CIR:
"What
is legitimate ‘mitigation’ and what is illegitimate
‘avoidance’ is in the end to be decided by the
Commissioner, the Taxation Review Authority and ultimately
the courts, as a matter of judgment"
In
IRC v.
Challenge Corporation Ltd
[1987] 2 WLR 24 Lord Templeman similarly attempted
to distinguish tax avoidance from tax mitigation:
"Income
tax is mitigated by the taxpayer who reduces his income
or incurs expenditure in circumstances which reduce his
assessable income . . . Income tax is avoided and a tax
advantage is derived from an arrangement when the taxpayer
reduces his liability to tax without involving him in a
loss or expenditure which entitles him to that reduction
. . . In an arrangement of tax avoidance the financial position
of the taxpayer is unaffected (save for the costs of devising
and implementing the arrangement) and by the arrangement
the taxpayer seeks to obtain a tax advantage without suffering
that reduction in income, loss or expenditure which other
taxpayers suffer and which Parliament intended to be suffered
by any taxpayer qualifying for a reduction in his liability
to tax.”
In
Ayrshire Pullman
Motor Services & Ritchie v. CIR CS 1929, 14
TC 754 Lord Clyde said:
“no
man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral
or other, so as to arrange his legal relations to his business
or to his property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put
the largest possible shovel in his stores…And the
taxpayer is…entitled to be astute to prevent, so
far as he honestly can, the depletion of his means by the
Revenue.”
Lord
Greene MR commented in Lord
Howard de Walden v. CIR [1942] 1 All ER 287 that :
“for
years a battle of maneuver has been waged between the Legislature
and those who are minded to throw the burden of taxation
off their own shoulders on to those of their fellow subjects.
In that battle the Legislature has often been worsted
by the skill, determination and resourcefulness of its opponents…it
would not shock us in the least to find that the Legislature
has determined to put an end to the struggle by imposing
the severest of penalties.
It scarcely lies in the mouth of the taxpayer who
plays with fire to complain of burnt fingers.”
4.4.
OECD
Summary of Tax Avoidance and its Effects
The
OECD summaries the effects of tax avoidance and evasion
as follows:
“Globalisation
and the removal of exchange controls and other barriers
to the free movement of capital have promoted economic development.
But they have also increased the scope for tax avoidance
and evasion, and the loss of tax revenues can be significant.
Tax
avoidance and evasion cause many problems. Governments lose
revenues and so taxes on those who do not escape the tax
net must rise to plug the gap. Countries where tax compliance
is highest lose out, as trade flows are diverted elsewhere.
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs has taken a number of steps
to combat international tax avoidance and evasion. The main
focus of this work is on improving the means for co-operation
between governments.
International
co-operation
Tax
authorities have responded to concerns about avoidance and
evasion by taking on new powers to collect information from
taxpayers. Delegates to the Working Party on tax avoidance
and evasion systematically inform other countries about
the means at their disposal for countering avoidance, covering
legislation, court decisions and audit techniques. It is
through this exchange of experiences that the Committee
is able to develop and promote the adoption of practices
that should enable tax authorities to administer their tax
laws in an effective and equitable manner. An example of
the results of such discussions is the OECD recommendation
on the use and disclosure of Tax Identification Numbers
(TINs) to increase compliance on cross-border income flows.
Ways
of increasing compliance in cross-border financial transactions
and on access to bank information for tax purposes are the
focus of current work. Additional work will also be carried
out to identify and address other barriers to the identification
of beneficial ownership and exchange of such information.
The
Committee has promoted the exchange of information between
tax authorities as the best way of fighting non-compliance
in transactions across borders. For this reason, the OECD
Model Convention contains an article on exchange
of information. Current work to improve exchange of information
includes looking not only at barriers to effective exchange
of information but also at how better use of the latest
information technology can help. OECD countries have adopted
a standard magnetic format for exchange of information.
The Working Party is also considering how technology can
be used to improve and expedite procedures for the certification
of residence for purposes of granting treaty benefits. A
pilot study on the exchange of TINs is being conducted.
The
Committee is also exploring the relationship between money
laundering and tax-related crimes. In particular, it is
examining how tax authorities can obtain access to information
gathered by anti-money laundering authorities both to pursue
tax offenses as well as to exchange that information with
foreign tax authorities.
Tax
inspectors meetings
With
identities concealed, real cases are examined in regular
meetings of tax inspectors. The aim is to share practical
experience and information among people working in the fields
of tax auditing and detection of fraud. Past meetings have
looked at the detection of evasion and avoidance schemes
in financial transactions, the use of tax-minimizing
vehicles in tax havens, tax-motivated cross-border transactions
and attributing profits in global trading concerns.
New
international legal instruments
Backing
up increased co-operation, new legal instruments have been
developed. In 1995, the Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,
established in co-operation with the Council of Europe,
came into force.
INTRODUCTION
TO TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION
Lesson
1
Introduction
to Anti-Avoidance Legislation in International Fiscal law
2.1.
Public and judicial opinion
2.2.
What is tax avoidance?
2.3.
What makes tax avoidance possible
2.4.
Main concepts
2.4.1.
A UK Perspective
2.4.2.
Definitions of Tax Avoidance
2.4.3.
The Main Areas of Tax Avoidance
2.4.4.
Descriptions of Tax Avoidance by the Courts
2.4.5.
OECD Summary of Tax Avoidance and its Effects
1.5
Glossary/lexicon
of commonly used words
1.6
Tax planning
1.6.1
What is tax Planning?
1.6.2
The Methods used to Plan Taxes
1.6.2.1
Reducing Assessable Income
1.6.2.2
Derive capital, not income
1.6.2.3
Avoid Deriving Assessable Amounts
1.6.2.4
Maximising the Cost Base of an Asset
1.6.2.5
Income Exemptions
1.7
Increasing Deductions
1.7.1
Deductions for Businesses
1.8
Reducing Rate and Deferring Payment of Tax
1.8.1
introduction
1.8.2
tax offsets and other benefits
1.8.3
withholding tax: interest, dividends and royalties
1.9
Methods of Diverting Income
1.9.1
introduction
1.9.2
transfer of income-producing assets
1.9.3
problems arising from the transfer of assets
1.9.4
contracting with associated taxpayers
1.9.5
discretionary distributions
1.9.5.1
partnerships and trusts
1.9.5.2
Dividends and Dividend Streaming
1.9.5.2.1
Dividend stripping
1.9.6
commercial considerations
1.9.7
Conduits
1.9.8
requirements of other statutes
1.10
Recipients of Diverted Income
1.10.1
choice of recipients
1.10.2
family members
1.10.3
family partnerships
1.10.4
family companies
1.10.5
family trusts
1.10.6
Family trusts or family companies?
1.10.7
Loss companies
1.10.8
Unit Trusts
1.10.9
Tax Havens
1.11
Avoiding Unforeseen Tax Problems
1.11.1
Partnership Restructuring
1.11.2
Business Sales
1.11.3
Capital Gains Tax Issues
1.11.4
Anticipating Tax Changes
Lesson
2
Definitions
of Tax Avoidance and Evasion
2.1
Tax avoidance and tax evasion
2.2
Potential overlap between avoidance and evasion
2.3
Characteristics of evasion and avoidance
2.4
The characteristics of evasion
2.5
The characteristics of avoidance
2.6
Constituent elements of avoidance and evasion
2.6.1
Tax minimisation or elimination should have resulted
2.6.2
Lawfulness or legality of the transaction
2.6.3
Relevance of the purpose or motive of the taxpayer
2.6.4
Artificiality criterion
2.6.5
Exploiting loopholes
2.6.6
Economic reality test
2.7
Legislative intent or purpose
2.8
Acceptable tax avoidance
2.9
unacceptable tax avoidance
2.10
Innocent and Fraudulent Evasion
2.11
Penalty Tax and Offences
2.12
Imposition of penalties
2.13
increase or decrease of penalty tax
2.14
tax avoision
2.14.1
Wine box inquiry (NZ)
2.14.2
Magnum transaction
2.15
Categories of tax avoidance schemes
2.16
Preventative
2.17
Curative
Lesson
3
Shams,
Substance over Form and Legislatures Response to Avoidance
3.1
Sham - meaning of the term
3.2
Essential features of a sham
3.3
Application
3.4
Effect of a sham
3.5
Cases involving sham transactions
3.6
Example
3.7
Summary
3.8
Substance over form - Legal provisions
3.9
Fraus legis, abus de droits
3.10
General anti avoidance rules (GAAR)
3.10.1
Country Analysis
3.11
Does GAAR
apply?
3.11.1
Is there a scheme?
3.11.2
Was a tax benefit obtained?
3.11.3
What was the purpose of the scheme?
3.11.3.1
Business Purpose test and Commerciality of Transactions
3.12
Cancellation of tax benefits
3.12.1
Advanced Rulings/clearance certificates
Lesson
4
Domestic
tax residence of foreign entities under Management and Control
concept
4.1
Court cases and legislation on Corporate residence
-
(ITSAPT + Nick’s article)
-
(Philip Baker’s book on Double Tax Treaties)
4.2
General legislation against the use of tax haven
entities
4.3
Determination of residence under double tax treaties
-
(Model OECD Commentary on Effective Management)
Lesson
5
Trading
within a territory without tax registration
5.1
Concept of trading within and trading with
-
(ITSAPT + Nick’s article)
5.2
Limited activities without taxation permitted under
double tax treaties
5.2.1
Model OECD Commentary on Permanent Establishments
5.3
Jeopardy assessments and withholding tax mechanisms
for transfers abroad
5.4
Clearance under advance tax rulings
Lesson
6
Specific
Anti Avoidance Rules – Controlled Foreign Companies
6.1
Introduction
6.2
Controlled foreign companies regime
6.2.1
Exemptions in various countries for eg active income
6.2.2
Conflict with double tax treaties
6.2.3
Upstream loan provisions
-
(ITSAPT sections for various countries + RS
articles (Website)
-
(Any IFA Cahiers on this topic?)
6.3
Foreign investment fund regime
6.4
Foreign tax credits
6.5
Income of non residents
Lesson
7
Specific
Anti Avoidance Rules Attribution of Foreign Income to Individuals
7.1
Income earned by foreign entities
7.2
Capital gains of foreign entities
7.3
Capital retained by offshore trusts and other entities
-
(B1.10.1 et seq for UK, Art 209B France, SubPart
F US etc)
-
(Any IFA Cahiers on this topic?)
Lesson
8
Specific
Anti Avoidance Rules – Transfer pricing
8.1
General overview of transfer pricing
8.2
Migration of trade
8.3
Adjustment of sale prices on transfers of assets
abroad
8.4
Transfer pricing re products and other expenses
-
(See US Transfer Pricing file in Training/Lessons)
-
(OECD Papers on Transfer Pricing)
-
(IFA Cahiers on Transfer Pricing)
8.5
General disallowance of expenses paid to tax haven
entities
-
(Excerpts from ITSAPT under sub-section 9
of various chapters)
8.6
Advance pricing agreements
-
See IFA Cahiers 1999 Eilat Conference
Lesson
9
Specific
Anti Avoidance Rules Thin Capitalisation
9.1
Thin capitalisation
9.1.1
(Basil Newton has written 50 pages on thin capitalisation)
(Any IFA Cahiers on this topic?)
9.2
Arm’s length concept in financing arrangements
9.3
Constructive dividend concept
-
(Add Swiss/German subsections to Newton’s notes)
-
(Any IFA Cahiers on this topic?)
Lesson
10
Double
tax treaty shopping and anti-avoidance measures
10.1
Use of conduit companies
10.2
Treaty shopping and abuse of treaties
-
(RS lecture notes)
10.3
Local rules eg Swiss Federal decree
10.4
Treaty anti-avoidance provisions and limitation of
benefits
-
(ITSAPT for LOBs + Scala/Osho files for Swiss/Dutch/US
reviews)
-
(Philip Baker’s book on Double Tax Treaties)
Lesson
11
Extension
of tax residence following emigration
11.1
Departure taxes for individuals
11.2
Continued domestic taxation on capital gains of certain
assets
- (ITSAPT sections on Canada, Australia, US (partial))
11.3
Double tax treaty provisions permitting continued
taxation
11.4
Crystallisation of tax liabilities on transfer of
corporate residence
Lesson
12
Reporting
requirements and Penalties imposed on non-payment of taxes
12.1
Incorporation of subsidiaries by parent corporations
12.2
Establishment of non-resident companies by individuals
12.3
Establishment of offshore trusts
12.4
Reporting transactions between domestic and foreign
entities
12.5
Ordinary penalties and interest on overdue payments
12.6
Equitable adjustments of profits between countries
Criminal
liability for tax evasion
12.7
Criminal penalties imposed for assistance in tax
evasion by professionals
- (Miles articles on NCIS reporting requirements)
LLM
Online Course Requirements for AAFM Financial Board Certification:
- CWM
Chartered Wealth Manager - Take LLM 131, and LLM200
- CTEP
Chartered Trust & Estate Planner - Take: LLM111 and
LLM 131
- CPM
Chartered Portfolio Manager - Take LLM 222
- CRA
Chartered Risk Manager - Take LLM106 and 110
- CAM
- Chartered Asset Manager - Take LLM 104 and LLM 105
- CMA
- Chartered Market Analyst - Take LLM 333 (Must of Masters
Degree, JD or CPA)
- RFS
- Registered Financial Specialist - LLM 101 and LLM 102
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